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What do we do with Ludwig Wittgenstein's Zettel? - An attempt to appreciate TS 233¹

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Introduction: Ludwig Wittgenstein - probably until 1947/48 - cut out fragments from his earlier typescripts (TSS), collected them in a box marked "Zettel". After Wittgenstein's death in 1951, Peter Geach fixed this material in two TSS volumes, which G.H. von Wright, one of three literary executors, attributed to Wittgenstein's work by assigning them the numbers "233A" and "233B" in his list (cp. v. Wright 1982a); before he published it together with E. Anscombe as early as 1967. A brief look at the remarks on around 170 text fragments (the physical "data carriers") suggest that TS 233 is one of the most complete presentations of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language after his return to philosophy in 1929 (until 1947/48). The problem here is that this TS is not recognized as "a work of Wittgenstein" (Cp. Schulte 1989, 46). That leads to my question: What do we do with the *Zettel*?


My presentation starts by looking at this controversial *material*, which is available as a TS and in published form; by 3 illustrations. This part is about the work of Wittgenstein, Geach and v. Wright and Anscombe.

II. In the second part I will present the content of the TS in fragmentary form.


III. Last but not least, I will give you my facit and together with my answer in what way the *Zettel* can be regarded as an example to von Wright's thesis that "Wittgenstein's writings from 1946 onwards represent in certain ways departures in *new directions*" (von Wright 1982, 136).

I.

1. The work of Ludwig Wittgenstein: From 10 TSS to a box labeled "Zettel"



Wittgenstein collected remarks from all around 10 TSSs in a box labelled "Zettel". Von Wright (1992, 187) reports that Wittgenstein himself used the name "Zettel" to refer to these fragments in conversation. Based on the remarks that he excerpted from TSS 208/209, 210, 211, 220, 239, 242, 228, 229 and 232, most of the remarks (approx. 60%) can be dated to the years 1946 to 1948.² Assuming that no fragments ("data carriers") were lost, Wittgenstein's



box probably contained around 740 remarks on around 170 fragments. It remains unclear whether Wittgenstein filled his Zettel-box over the years or only started doing so after all or some of the original typescripts had been completed. (Cp. von Wright 1992, 187.) Wittgenstein "worked on the fragments, changed and refined them" (Z 1981, preface, iv). These changes are made by hand, for example through deletions, additions to the text, cross-references and through annotations.

Wittgenstein also adds entire notes (approx. 38) by hand.³ As a result, some of these remarks only appear in TS 233 and nowhere else in the *Nachlass*. There are also incomplete, difficult to read, inadequate text on the fragments, which, to be understandable, must be supplemented by reference



to their sources. - In this context, too, the question arises as to when Wittgenstein began revising (rewriting) these remarks and when he completed them. Anscombe and von Wright (Z 1981, preface, iii) can only provide vague information about Wittgenstein's own 'arrangement' of the pieces of paper in the box: "Often fragments on the same topic were clipped together; but there were also a large number lying loose in the box". Beside this, we have no information about the number, extent (scope), and placement of the remarks that Wittgenstein himself stapled together. This is even more regrettable as there is no statement by

¹ This working-paper is an abridged and revised version of an article I wrote in German in connection with the 43. International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg 2022. - References to Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* are based on von Wright's list (v. Wright 1982a); the text of the *Nachlass* is taken from the *Bergen Electronic Edition* (cf. WAB 2026). - All translations into English of Wittgenstein's TSS and MSS that are not already available in English have been produced using 'DeepL Translator'.

² A complete assignment of all remarks in TS 233 to their sources can be found in Maury 1981, Biesenbach 2002 and Oku 2005.

³ For detailed information about the occurrence of handwritten remarks in TS 233, see Maury 1981 and Biesenbach 2002.

Wittgenstein as to what he intended to do with these fragments. Nor is anything known about the whereabouts (the fate) of the box in which Wittgenstein collected his fragments.

2. The work of Peter Geach: From a box labeled “Zettel” to the TSS 233A and 233B



A few years before 1967,⁴ Geach created TSS 233A (“Note I”) and 233B (“Note II”) from the contents of Wittgenstein’s box by fixing the fragments in two account books. He placed 361 remarks on the first 72 pages of TS 233A and 379 remarks on 65 paginated pages of TS 233B. The texts in both of Geaches books are mostly stuck close together, that is, without any space (blanks) between them. Where Geach cuts up Wittgenstein's fragments again, he does so to adapt Wittgenstein's text excerpts to the space in his account books, where this seems necessary to him due to a page change. It appears that Geach 'revised' (reworks) the order of his fragments by inserting nine foldable text fragments into the TS. Following Anscombe and von Wright, Geach “made an arrangement of this material, keeping together what were in single bundles, and otherwise fitting the pieces as well as he could according to subject matter” (*Zettel* 1981, preface, iii). - Geach arranges the fragments in the two TSS not only by topics, but also chronologically with reference to the source TSS. He supplements individual remarks by hand with text from the surviving typescripts where the text on the fragments appears to him to be incomplete. Furthermore, in TS 233 there are a whole series of handwritten notes from Geach in English; including the sources of individual remarks, especially if these can be found in TS 227. Geach signed them it in the TSS.⁵ In this context, a remark by the editors of the *Zettel* in their preface remains puzzling. On the one hand, they state that Geach’s work “a very instructive and readable compilation” (*Zettel* 1981, preface, iii). On the other hand, they note that this “arrangement is not the kind of arrangement that Wittgenstein made of his ‘remarks’” (*Zettel* 1981, preface, iii). What kind of arrangement of fragments Wittgenstein had in mind remains as unanswered as the question of why Geach did not organise the fragments in this way.

3. The work of Elisabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright: From the TSS 233A and 233B to the Zettel-Publication

The TS 233 was first published in 1967 (*Zettel* 1967) and in a second edition in 1981 (*Zettel* 1981) by Anscombe and Wright and with the support of Heikki Nyman under the title “Zettel” in a bilingual edition translated by Anscombe. In *Zettel* 1981 an index by Stephen Amdur in English is added to the text. “Only as now printed,” said von Wright about the second edition “can the text claim to be a complete faithful rendering of the original writings” (von Wright 1997, 20).⁶ Through a series of editorial interventions, the editors succeed in bringing the text into a more reader-friendly version in the first and even more so in the revised and second editions. For example, they number the typescript text and distribute it across 717 remarks in their publication. It happens that the editors combine two remarks from TS 233 into one remark and the other way around. Among the remarks from TS 233 that do not have (bear) a number in the published *Zettel* are five pieces of text that were not published in the first edition of 1967 but were published as footnotes in the second edition of 1981. 19 remarks, both handwritten and typewritten, from TS 233, including complete and incomplete ones, are not included in the *Zettel* (1989).⁷ Z 354 was not found in the Zettel-box.⁸ Editorial interventions in TS 233 are for example a completion of incomplete sentences, the correction of texts and the selection of text alternatives offered in the TS. In some cases, the editors follow Wittgenstein's instruction; in other not. The arrangement of the remarks does not always follow the order given by the paginated TS 233 by Geach and thus possibly also by Wittgenstein. - There is no doubt that the editors' editorial interventions have

⁴The editors date this with “Some years ago Peter Geach made an arrangement of this material [...]” (Z 1981, preface, iii).

⁵ Z 567 and Z 559, in which *typewritten* text in English appears, are not signed. Biesenbach (2002) and Oku (2005, 7) assume that Geach typed this remarks himself and inserted it there. -

⁶ The editors speak about “many inaccuracies, and even some misunderstandings of the original text” in the first edition. (*Zettel* 1981, preface, v)

⁷ These include those published in PI I as well as those that appear later in *Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment* (PI II).

⁸ According to the editors (Z 1989, 356), the text was taken from MS 137, 6a from 1948.

enormously improved the readability of the text as it appears in TS 233. Although some of these changes compared to TS 233 are disclosed in their preface and footnotes, the question arises whether more transparency would not have been possible regarding the information contained in the original TS 233.

II.

3. Psychological concepts in a “synoptic view” (Z 464)

The arrangement of the remarks in *Zettel* shows that Geach tried to structure Wittgenstein's grammatical investigation by topics. I have tried to list some of these (a selection) in a table:

1. ZZ 1–35: Meaning.
2. ZZ 36–52: Intending and wanting.
3. ZZ 53–70: Expecting and hoping.
4. ZZ 71–87: ‘Classification of Psychological Concepts’ (A).
5. ZZ 88–144: Thinking.
6. ZZ 145–194: Experiences of meaning and understanding of music.
7. ZZ 195–275: Understanding and the system of language.
8. ZZ 276–330: Rule following and the concept of language.
9. ZZ 331–393: Foundations of our concepts; with colour as an example.
10. ZZ 394–439: Knowledge and doubt.
11. ZZ 440–467: Philosophy.
12. ZZ 468–530: ‘Classification of Psychological Concepts’ (B).
13. ZZ 531–576: Uncertainty about mental states; with pain as an example.
14. ZZ 577–604: Voluntary and involuntary actions.
15. ZZ 605–649: Seeing, aspect-seeing and imagining.
16. ZZ 650–675: Remembering and the ability to do something.
17. ZZ 676–711: Logic: conditional predictions, contradictions and mathematics.
18. ZZ 712–717: Miscellaneous.

What immediately stands out here is the wide range of topics covered in the 717 remarks. Secondly, many of these topics are familiar from the PI; from both Part I and Part II (*Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment*). In addition, there are some remarks that clearly point toward *On Certainty* (OC) and the *Remarks on Colour* (ROC).

Wittgenstein’s investigation of these verbs and concepts in *Zettel* is not after “completeness” (Z 465) or “*exactness*, but after a synoptic view” (Z 464), creating a clarity (PI 122) that “casts light on the correct treatment of *all* [psychological concepts]” (Z 465) is his aim. By this “synoptic view” (Z 464) becomes one of the key concepts also in his *Zettel*. The methodological question to this kind of project can we find in Z 448: “What is the everyday use of [our psychological vocabulary] in ordinary language” (Cp. Z 113, PI 116). The difficulty standing in the way of the reconstruction of the everyday use of psychological verbs in *Zettel* is initially no different from that in PI I: a misleading surface grammar, misunderstood images, exaggerated expectations with regard to an orderly regulation of colloquial language (cf. Z 111). We ask for explanations, which lead us into the scientific temptation to attribute the use of psychological verbs (cf. Z 192) to inner processes; indeed, to explain them through them. And his warning in *Zettel* is - just as elsewhere - that the description of the use of these expressions (their grammar) must not be understood as an explanation of an action (cf. Z 655 and PI 654ff.).

Despite these difficulties, the idea of “therapy” (cf. PI 133) remains a little bit in the background. A real fly-bottle feeling (cf. PI 309) may not arise in TS 233. The fact that Wittgenstein remains loyal to this idea here too is shown by a motto in Z 690 (“Our motto might be: ‘Let us not be bewitched’”) similar to PI 109 (“Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language”)⁹ and the Augustinian quotation “... quia plus loquitur inquisition quam inventio ...”¹⁰ that Wittgenstein marked by hand as a “preface” (Z 457). May be these fits to Z 38; he writes there: “In philosophizing we

⁹ In Z 690, Wittgenstein writes “behexen”, whilst he uses the term “verhexen” in PI 109.

¹⁰ The editors of the second edition of the *Zettel* (1981) translate it with “... because the search says more than the discovery ...”. (*Zettel*, 1981, p. 81)

may not *terminate* a disease of thought. It must run its natural course, and *slow* cure is all important.” (Cp. MS 110, 58.)

And in this sense he remarks: If someone use a concept in a wrong way we “cannot illumine the matter by fighting against [his] words, but only by trying to turn [her] attention away from certain expressions, illustrations, images, and *towards* the *employment* of the words” (Z 463). It seems to be obvious that Wittgenstein hold on in the box with the same idea about philosophy as we can find it in PI I and in the *Big Typescript* (TS 213 / 1932/33): The “difficulty of Philosophy [is] not the Intellectual Difficulty of the Science, but the Difficulty of a Change of Attitude. Resistance of the will Must be Overcome” (BT 1932/33, Kap 86: *Philosophy*).

Wittgenstein's philosophical investigation presents itself in *Zettel* as a reconstruction “not [of] symptoms, but [of] logical criteria” (Z 466). Although he is aware here that the use of our psychological concepts is not “decided by appeal to majority” (Z 431), he leaves - also here in agreement with PI I - no doubt that language games “only works, [...] when a certain agreement prevails [and] the concept of agreement does not enter into the language-game” (Z 430 / cp. PI 241).

Another defining feature of this TS 233 seems to be that Wittgenstein uses a lot of concepts from earlier writings¹¹ and supplements them with new information. This is particularly striking for the concept of ‘language-game’, another key-concept of this TS. On the one hand he presupposes the knowledge about this concept, when he gives in many of his remarks the instruction to study the use of a psychological concept in the language-game where it “is in its element” (Z 391)¹². On the other hand, he presents new information about language-games - e.g. regarding its origins (cp. Z 545).

In this respect the *Zettel* box requires some prior knowledge about Wittgenstein's philosophy; and raises so a further question: Whom is this material intended for? More generally, whom does Wittgenstein want to reach with his philosophy? (Only himself? Or only friends?)

4. A “classification of psychological concepts” (Z 488) by states and dispositions

Maybe the following plan for Wittgenstein's treatment of psychological concepts¹³ (cp. Z 472 / Z 488f.) can be drawn up. Wittgenstein sometimes also speaks of “psychological phenomena” (Z 464), “phenomena of mental life” (“Erscheinungen des Seelenlebens”, Z 465) and about a “pedigree of psychological concepts” (Z 464, “Stammbaum der psychologischen Phänomene”).¹⁴

¹¹ Concepts as ‘training’ (‘drill’), ‘reaction’ and ‘language-game’ elsewhere, for example in PI 7 and of course at the beginning of the 30 years, still controversially discussed and sometimes explicitly explained, are often part of the presentation, used as a kind of solutions in *Zettel*, they belong here in Wittgenstein's toolbox and not what is discussed.

¹² The original German text contains the expression “zu Hause” (Z 391). In PI 2 (German 2009), where Wittgenstein also writes “zu Hause”, it is translated by Anscombe, Hacker and Schulte (2009) as “at home”. Maybe this fits better with the social point of language.

¹³ In April 1947, Wittgenstein wrote in MS 134. 124: “It is very difficult to give the family tree of experiences; because it is difficult to turn the old concepts on their head.”

¹⁴ A different classification can be found in Schulte (1993, 26–36), who, with reference to *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (RPP), distinguishes between an early and a later classification.

Psychological Concepts

(a selection from *Zettel*.)

States of consciousness

No-states of consciousness

("Dispositions")

'Emotion'

('Gemütsbewegung')

'Experience'

('Erlebnis')

'Sensation'

('Empfindung')

'sadness'
'depression'
'happiness'
'indifference'
'joy'
'fear'

'pain experience'
'visual experience'
'imagination experiences'
'listening experience'
'dream experience'

'sensation of pain'
'tactile sensation'
'taste perception'
'temperature sensitivity'
'feelings'

'can'
'understand'
'to know'
'believe'
'master'
'love', 'hate'
("emotional dispositions")

'meaning'
'understanding'
'expecting'
'intention'
'wish'
'hope'
'expectation'

Wittgenstein points out similarities and differences between groups: all psychological verbs have in common "that the third person of the present is to be verified by observation, the **first** person not" (Z 472 / BPP 1989, II, §63). Therefore, for all psychological concepts, the following applies "I cannot know that I'm experiencing pain" (for example). I have no reason for it.¹⁵ Whereas others can know that I'm experiencing pain and can provide reasons for their knowledge. As a result, we receive an "information" (Z 472) for the third person perspective on mental processes, and an "expression" (Z 472) for its first-person present tense.¹⁶ Wittgenstein divides psychological verbs according to states of consciousness on the one hand and dispositions on the other. All states of consciousness have in common, for example, that they differ from dispositions in that they possess a "real duration" and do not need to be verified "by spotcheck whether they are still going on" (Z 72). In a remark in TS 232, §045, which Wittgenstein only partially repeats in Z 85, Wittgenstein writes about this distinction: "I mean to say: believing, understanding, knowing, intending, etc., are not states of consciousness. If I call the latter 'dispositions' for a moment, an important difference between dispositions and states of consciousness is that a disposition is not interrupted by an interruption of consciousness or a shift in attention."

He further subdivides the states of consciousness into emotions, experiences and sensations. Emotions differ from sensations, for example, in that "they are not localized" (Z 488). The differentiation does not stop at the subgroups either. For example, he distinguishes between directed and undirected emotions ("fear *at* something, joy *over* something", Z 488), and voluntary experiences such as "imagining" from involuntary ones such as "seeing".

All "sense-experiences" ("Sinneserlebnisse", Z 477) have the logical criterion in common: "that they give us knowledge about the external world" (Z 477). For Wittgenstein in TS 233, pain is both an experience ("experiencing pain" / "Schmerzerlebnis", Z 542) and a sensation ("Sinnesempfindung", Z 483).

Wittgenstein also speaks of concepts of experience (Erfahrungsbegriffe) in TS 233. In TS 229, §1504 he calls these "a subclass of experience concepts (Erlebnisbegriffe)".

In contrast to the verbs that go hand in hand with states of consciousness, there are the psychological verbs that do not, by Wittgenstein, refer to any (so-called) "inner process" (PI 580).¹⁷ Here in *Zettel* we encounter, among other things, the grammar of expressions well known from PI I (TS 227), such as "to

¹⁵ That is what PI 247 ("Only you can know if you had that intention.") is about.

¹⁶ Wittgenstein adds here "Not quite right" (Z 472); probably because many things that appear in the form of the first-person singular can nevertheless be corrected. See also Schulte (1993, pp. 24–36) which provides a detailed classification of Wittgenstein's psychological concepts.

¹⁷ Geach starts his TS with these concepts.

think of a particular person" (Z 13), "meaning this and that" (cf. ZZ 1–35), "intending something" (cf. ZZ 36–52), "expecting something or someone" (cf. ZZ 53–70) and "hoping for this or that" (Z 64) ¹⁸.

Here, in a classic way, the problem of mental states ("real duration or 'just' ongoing?") is linked to that of the meaning and understanding of words and sentence: How can we mean something or someone with our words? - Among other things Wittgenstein states here the old idea that the sign receives their content (meaning) through "the system to which the sign belongs" (Z 228) and not due to states of consciousness that accompany their use. (All these arguments against mentalism are well known from PI I.)

Although Wittgenstein justifies his classification through "analogies and connections between these concepts" (Z 474), his scepticism about such attempts is already expressed in *Zettel* when he writes: "Philosophers and psychologists: they classify clouds by their shape" (Z 462; with a source in MS 105, 44 / 1929!). And as early as 6th November 1948¹⁹ noticed Wittgenstein in his MS 137, 89b: "Knowledge, belief, hope, fear (among others) [...] are such diverse concepts that classifying them or categorizing them into different compartments is of no use to us. However, we wish to recognize the differences and similarities between them". And in Part II (TS 234/ 1949?) of the PI he gives up the idea of such a classification of psychological verbs. (Cf. PI II, xi, 539.)

5. The use of psychological verbs and concepts as a social affair

In *Zettel* (TS 233), Wittgenstein supplements his classification with detailed images of our daily use of our psychological verbs. In doing so, he chooses terms such as 'to feel pain', 'to think' and the use of colour terms as examples. In order to become clear about a concept, one must become clear about the connections and the function by which it is normally characterized in our life (cf. Z 532). Only surrounded by certain *normal* "manifestations of life" (Z 110) is there such a thing as an expression of pain (cf. Z 534, Z 629).

And in order to describe the use of "to simulate pain" (as a footnote to Z 566), it is not enough to describe "what *one* man is doing *now*, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions ["Gewimmel der menschlichen Handlungen"], the background against which we see any action [...]" (Z 567) is necessary. (Cp. MS 137, 41b; TS 229, 247.) "To be in pain" seems to be the result of a 'cooperation' between a single person and his group; there is no pain behaviour without us; and that means no pain.) Wittgenstein makes a handwritten comment on this in Z 533: "Pain has *this* position in our life; has *these* connections. (That is to say: we only call "pain" what has *this* position, *these* connexions)". To learn a concept like 'pain' does not only mean to learn the use of "pain" but to learn what pain is. So that we can say that the use of psychological concepts is at every stage a social affair. The similar applies to him with regard to the "general phenomenon of natural history" (Z 469) of hope. To call hope "an inner process", according to Wittgenstein, is "nonsense!" (Z 469). Rather, it is so complex that a person's "daily life" only "bit by bit [...]" becomes such that there is a place for hope in it" (Z 469). And Wittgenstein comments on this, writing in an anti-behaviorist sense in Z 523: "It might now be asked whether [psychological verbs] would really relate simply to behaviour, simply to bodily changes. And this may be denied. There is no future in simplifying the use of [psychological verbs] in this way". What is needed is "behaviour under certain external circumstances. If we observe these circumstances and that behaviour, we say that a man is . . . or has . . ." (Z 523). In accordance with his argument regarding private languages in PI I Wittgenstein points out here that "private tables, [...] don't belong to the *game*" (Z 552 / TS 233b, 36) with psychological concepts. And he formulates this somewhat differently in Z 554: "The 'inner' and the 'outer', a *picture*". In Z 608 Wittgenstein argues not only against mentalism but also against a biological explanation, when he writes: "No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking [...]" And in Z 610 he adds to this: "If this upsets our concepts of causality then it is hey time they were upset".

¹⁸ Using the example of hope, Wittgenstein shows that this does not mean that they cannot *last* and therefore cannot be described as a "state of mind" (state of consciousness). (Cf. Z 78).

¹⁹ Wittgenstein drew material for his *Zettelbox* from MS 137 only up to October 1948. That means that this remark was not in the box.

The mental phenomena - Wittgenstein also speaks here of patterns in the tapestry of life²⁰ - can neither be expected to occur completely nor in isolation from one another in reality (cf. Z 568). Varying actions (occurrences) fall under one and the same psychological concept. It is essential for concepts that "concepts [...] are not intended for single use" (Z 568). For example, we can hope, grieve and be afraid in one way or another. (Cp. PI II, i, §2.) "We, in our conceptual world, keep on seeing the same, recurring with variations. That is how our concepts take it" (Z 568) These variations are part of the physiognomy of using psychological verbs (cf. 137, 53a). (Cp. TS 232 § 626; cf. MS 137, 54af.) "And one pattern in the weave is interwoven with many others" (Z 569); and this sometimes in a hierarchical way.

One can only simulate pain where one can have pain, "as he can miscalculate only if he has learnt to calculate" (Z 410). (Cp. PI II, xi §363) Also, only someone who has first "learnt what 'red' means, i. e. has learnt the technique of using the word" (Z 418) can use the expression "that *looks* red" (Z 418). A remark that might suggest that, for Wittgenstein, the entire world cannot simply be an illusion. Wittgenstein seems to be making fun of the realist's- and idealist's view when he asked in Z 414: «Won't the difference [between the idealist-educated children and the realist ones] only be one of battle cry? ".

These examples in *Zettel* show what the challenge is for those who want to describe such complex grammar. He must go beyond an isolated utterance and reveal the connection between expression and life. Without grasping "the use of language with the other processes of life" (MS 137, 61b), the role of an expression in a language-game can neither be identified nor described. This leads to the problem: How can such complex grammar (language) be taught (teach), learnt and spoken correctly? As challenges for teachers, scholars and last but not least analytic philosophers.

6 . Teaching and learning of ragged psychological concepts (cp. TS 233a, 24)

According to Wittgenstein, psychological concepts are widely ramified concepts (cp. Z 110), concepts "that comprises many manifestations of life" (Z 110), phenomena that "are widely scattered" (Z 110). Instead of the regular use we expect, these concepts have a «tattered" ("zerfetzte", Z 111) or "ragged" ("zerlumppte", TS 233a, 24), inconsistent (cf. Z 112) use. As a result, it is difficult, incomplete or impossible to *describe* the circumstances in which psychological verbs and concepts are used.²¹ "I now want to say," says Wittgenstein,

that humans who employ such [concepts] would *not* have to be able to describe its use.²² And were they to try, it is possible that they would give a quite inadequate description. (Like most people, if they tried to describe the use of money correctly.)²³ (They are not prepared for such a task.) (Z 525.)

With "to think" (cf. ZZ 88-144), Wittgenstein makes clear what can "be said of all psychological verbs" (Z 113).:

If a normal human is holding a normal conversation under normal circumstances, and I were to be asked what distinguishes thinking from not-thinking in such a case, --- I should not know what answer to give. And I *could certainly not* say that the difference lay in something that goes on or fails to go on while he is speaking. (Z 93.)

²⁰ Von Savigny (1988, 15–24) explains Wittgenstein's remarks on mental states in PI I using a "pattern-recipe." According to Savigny, the fact that someone, for example, means something consists "in the fact that the patterns of his or her individual behavior are embedded in a certain way within patterns of social behavior in the community to which he belongs" (v. Savigny 1988, 7).

²¹ In Wittgenstein's request "What's ragged should be left ragged" (MS 128, 46 / 1944; there in English) Winch (1997, 57) sees "one of Wittgenstein's most important methodological remarks characterizing as it does the radical change that took place in his later work in his conception of the philosophical search for clarity".

²² Wittgenstein points out this difficulty, amongst other things, in PI 156 with reference to the word "reading". - By the concept of "imponderable evidence" (PI II, xi, §359) which makes it for example possible to distinguish the genuine state of mind from a pretended one in an inexplicable way Wittgenstein gives another example for that 'our know how' goes further as 'our know' that. A detailed examination of the concept of imponderable evidence in Wittgenstein's late philosophy can be found in Trächtler 2021, 201ff, chap. 4.2..

²³ Maybe he got this idea from his friend, the economist P. Sraffa (cp. P I, preface, 4).

Furthermore, by the concept 'thinking' he makes clear how different language-games, e.g. with "to think", "to command" and "to expect", are interwoven (cf. Z 644). - According to Wittgenstein, learning a language therefore does not consist of referring to an inner process or of being able to describe (explain) what one has learnt; but react in the right way. A categorization or description of these verbs is based on shaky ground and is therefore - as mentioned - only useful to a limited extent, i.e. for a specific purpose ("now and here"). And it probably also led to Wittgenstein later abandoning the attempt to classify psychological verbs.

Wittgenstein also makes it clear in *Zettel* that this is irrelevant for practical, grammatically correct usage. The language users have mastered the technique of using these expressions (cf. Z 119), in so far, the majority is on their side.²⁴

They "*can teach* a person the use of the word! For a description of those circumstances is not needed for that" (Z 115); cf. Z 295; Z 26; Z 103 / PI 65–71). Wittgenstein attaches great importance to this when he writes in Z 116: "I just teach him the word *under particular circumstances*". We can correct others "if a circumstance makes the use doubtful" (Z 118 / Cp. PI 54), without having to "enumerate the conditions under which the word [...] is to be used" (Z 118).

According to Wittgenstein, it cannot even be ruled out that someone "as soon as he tries, he produces nothing that is not completely wrong" (Z 121). In a lecture from 1947/48, he formulated this – there about the use of the word "perhaps" - even more clearly when he claimed: "*Any* explanation that comes into our head is *always* wrong" (*Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology*; PGL 1988, 7).

By using the verb "to understand", Wittgenstein elaborates in *Zettel* on the idea of following grammatical rules that we cannot explicitly verbalize. (See ZZ 276–330.) This is not just about inconsistent, ragged usage, which makes it difficult or impossible to present their rules, but also about the *direct* use (understanding) of psychological *verbs*, which are not the exception in everyday life, but represents the normal case. Be it that understanding - ultimately and necessarily - consists in following orders without (prior) interpretation, i.e. "blindly" (PI 219), or that we directly perceive emotions such as fear, joy, sadness in the face of another without *inferring* them from "facial contortions" ("Gesichtsverziehungen") (Z 225) with the help of a rule. "This", according to Wittgenstein, "belongs to the concept of emotions" (Z 225). We *see* how the other feels! "She is in pain!" is under normal circumstances not the result of a conclusion. By this a person's emotional state is a public affair too.

The basis of every explanation, says Wittgenstein about the acquisition of these abilities, "has its foundation in training" (Z 419) ((may be "drill" is a better translation here for "Abrichtung")). We cannot "describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by *teaching* you, *training* you to employ rules" (Z 318). "For just where one says 'But don't you *see* ...? the rule is no use, it is what is explained, not what does the explaining" (Z 302 / cf. also PI 185). "The chain of reasons has an end" (Z 301 / PI 326).²⁵ "Aspect-seeing" (cp. , "puzzle picture" (Z 277), "electrical machines and installations" (Z 711) and "if you find the signpost [...] you *walk*" (Z 277), as discussed in PI 85, are among the examples here which Wittgenstein presents. The important remarks on the "physiognomy" (PI 235) of following a rule, which are known from PI 228–238, can be found in Z 276, Z 277, Z 279, Z 282, among others.

7. The origin and framework of our psychological verbs and concepts²⁶

In *Zettel* (TS 233) Wittgenstein does not stop at showing the grammar of psychological verbs and presenting them conceptually; and the teaching and learning of them under normal circumstances (cp. Z 93). Rather, he

²⁴The expressions "'daily practice'" (PI 197), "'customs', 'traditions', 'institutions'" (PI 199) do not appear in TS 233. In contrast, Wittgenstein uses the term "use" ("Gebrauch") several times here, but not the expression "constant use" ("ständiger Gebrauch", cf. PI 198). In contrast, he uses the term "technique" several times in TS 233. (Cf. Z 291, "the technique of projection".)

²⁵Neither "paradox" (PI 201) nor the term "practice" (PI 202) appears in his remarks about rule-following in TS 233; the same applies to "conventions", "customs", "institutions" (cp. PI 199).

²⁶In his MS 136 (47a, 1947/48), Wittgenstein uses only once in his entire *Nachlass* the term "framework". He crosses it out (later?) and replaces it with "Gerüst" ("scaffolding").

completes his investigation by discussing ‘where these rules come from’ and what conditions their use is subject to.

To avoid being accused of doing natural science instead of philosophy with his philosophical investigation, Wittgenstein makes use of fictional language games to carry out this ambitious project; on condition that these are sufficiently similar to ours. (Cp. also Z 102.) In this context he also speaks of "auxiliary constructions" (Z 528). And the whole thing is sometimes carried out by him on the backs of (fictitious) "slaves" (cf. Z 108, Z 530, Z 528). Thinking and imagining a life under other different conditions, a fictive life that is *like* ours in one way or another. “And there is no deciding how close the correspondence must be to give us the right to use the concept ‘thinking’ in their case too” (Z 102); without running the risk of missing the concept. Not doing scientific hypothetical experiments makes this method for Wittgenstein to a philosophical one. This is done in *Zettel* again with reference to our colour system and our concept of pain (cf. Z 380); also in connection with the concept of pretending (cf. Z 383) and that of thinking (cf. Z 88-144).

Even in TS 233, Wittgenstein does not trace the grammar of our psychological verbs and the associated concepts back to a pre-linguistic world. Maybe in agreement with PI 373²⁷, he states that these concepts cannot be justified by the nature of the objects that fall under them.

Wittgenstein discusses this claim in connection with our concepts of colour. (Cf. ZZ 331-393.) One cannot claim that the grammar of colour words represents "the world as [it] actually is" (Z 331). Nor do we have our psychological concepts "because [they have] proved advantageous" (Z 700 / cf. PI 467). That we introduce certain concepts because they are advantageous for us is not thereby excluded. (Cp. Z 700.)

Therefore “the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous, as cooking and washing are not” (Z 320). "The rules of grammar [are in this sense] arbitrary" (Z 331).²⁸ What this (only) "in a certain sense autonomous" (Z 320) means is concretized by Wittgenstein in *Zettel* in several ways.

Wittgenstein explains what he calls "the origin" of our psychological language-games. He writes: A language-game, insofar as it is of interest to us, is always "the new (spontaneous, 'specific')" (TS 233a, 14).²⁹ And this means to him that a language game, which can also include "the use of *several* words" (Z 644), "does not have its origin in *consideration*" (Z 391). It is not the object and not the result of a discussion. "Consideration is part of the language-game" (Z 391).³⁰ In connection with the concept of pain, he states that “our language is often merely an auxiliary” (Z 545) through which an instinctive behaviour is further developed. He writes about this:

Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation (“Verhalten”). Our language-game is an extension of primitive behavior. (For our *language-game* is behavior.) (Instinct.) (Z 545)³¹

²⁷ PI 373: “Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)”.

²⁸ Wittgenstein formulated this idea in a similar way at the beginning of the 1930s when he wrote: “For when I say that the rules are arbitrary, I mean that they are not determined by reality, like the description of this reality. And that means: It is nonsense to say that they agree with reality, that the rule about the words “blue”, “red”, for example, agree with the facts relating to these colours, etc..” (MS 112, 64rf. from October 1931.)

²⁹ This remark can be found handwritten in TS 233a, 14 after Z 42 marked with “LL” (“a loose leaf”) in the margin, which, according to Schulte (1993, 6), is a reference to the material in PU II (TS 234). This idea was *not included* in the published text of *Zettel* (1989); but later appears again in PU II (MS 144, 56v) and OC (1989, §559).

³⁰ Cf. PI 241.

³¹ This idea of Wittgenstein from TS 233b, which draws on sources in TS 229, § 817, is not new in the *Nachlass*. He already writes this in MS 119, 146f. from October 21, 1937 in a similar way: “The origin & primitive form of the language game is a reaction; Only on this can the more complicated forms grow. The language – I want to say – is a refinement, ‘in the beginning was the deed’”. (Cp. OC §402.) - Wittgenstein does not use the expression “natural history” in TS 233, but he does in PI 25: “Giving orders, asking questions, telling stories, having a chat are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing.” And in PI 415 he writes in this regard: “What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; [...]”.

But what is the word “primitive” meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of behaviour is *pre-linguistic*: that a language game is based *on it*, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought. (Z 541)

With reference to Z 540, Z 541, Z 542 Malcolm (1981, 3f.) emphasizes W.’s thesis that the help we give to those who are suffering does not stem from rational consideration (it is *not* the case that: “by analogy with our own case we believe that he is experiencing pain too”, Z 542) but has its origins in a primitive reaction. As we have seen, we play this game without reasons.³²

In *Zettel*, Wittgenstein does not attempt to explain the existence of such primitive language games in a *causal way*. Nor does he go so far as to explain why we play these language games, or why we have these concepts and not others. (Cf. Glock 2005, 137f.) Nevertheless, in *Zettel* he also points out *dependencies* that limit the range of our language-games. In this respect, Glock (2005, 136f.) speaks of biological, sociopsychological and physical facts.

By this Wittgenstein presents the grammar (use) of our psychological concepts in TS 233 not only as arbitrary, but at the same time in some way as non-arbitrary. Among other conditions from TS 233, the following examples have an influence on the concepts we live by:

- “An education quite different from ours” (Z 387) can lead to quite different concepts. We have these concepts because we were raised *that way*. (Brought up that way.) (See Z 387 / TS 232.)
- Language-games only work when a certain agreement prevails. (Cf. Z 430). We would not have many concepts if we did not agree on certain judgments. (See Z 430; Z 351 / TS 232.) – (With colour agreement as example?)³³
- Where certain phenomena only occur rarely (are only seldom to be found), a concept is not created for them. They remain isolated without being subsumed under one concept. (See Z 376 / handwritten in TS 233b.)
- Language games are “characterized **by** what human can do and what they cannot do” (e.g. “seeing colors”) (Z 345 / TS 229). People have the ability to learn language games from examples. (Cp. “that he proceeds like *this* and not like *that* in a particular new case”; Z 355 (a “natural fact”, “Naturfaktum”; Z 355). / TS 232.) Certain concepts are ‘missing’ where **abilities** – such as seeing and hearing – are not present. (See Z 378 / TS 232, Z 388 / TS 232.) A society with deaf or ‘feeble-minded’ people could not use many of our concepts. (See Z 371 / TS 229.)
- However, it also shows that certain general facts alone are not sufficient (mandatory “*zwingend*”) for the formation of a concept. There must also be an *interest* in this type of phenomenon in society. (Cf. Z 352 / TS 232). An example of this from Wittgenstein is “the concept of modesty or of swaggering”, which according to Wittgenstein only exists where these phenomena are of interest. (Cf. Z 378 / PI 570.)

And in clear proximity to PI 142³⁴, Wittgenstein sets out the limits of our language games by some special, for us not normal “events” in Z 393:

It is easy to imagine and work out in full detail events which, if they actually came about, would throw us out in all our judgment.

[...] if things, humans and animals were to behave as they never did before, then I should say something like “I have gone mad”; but that would merely be an expression of giving up the attempt³⁵ to know my way about. [...]

³²ZZ 541-Z 545 are probably among the most discussed remarks from TS 233. In particular, a lively discussion has arisen in the literature around the term ‘prototype’, based on the article by Norman Malcolm (cf. 1982, 1ff.). According to Malcolm these primitive forms of behaviour are not only replaced by language but are also refined and further developed. By Winch (1997, 60f.) the term “prototype” “does not imply that there was something which existed before our grammar came into existence on which this grammar is based. [...] On this interpretation it seems that Wittgenstein is offering a theory of language development [...]”. See also (for example) Wolgast (1994, 589f.), Rhees (1997, 1ff.), and Trächtler (2021).

³³ Raatzsch points out that agreement regarding the use of our colour words is not a condition of their application, but rather one of the rules according to which we use these concepts. (Cp. Raatzsch 1995, p. 273.)

³⁴ Wittgenstein writes in PI 142: “And if things were quite different from what they actually are – if there were, for instance, no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, or joy; if rule became exception, and exception rule [...] our normal language-games would thereby lose their point.”

³⁵“I don’t know my way around” as a “formulation of every philosophical problem,” Wittgenstein formulated for the first time in 1931 in MS 153b, 24v and repeated this almost verbatim in PI 123.

But the important thing about this for me is that there isn't any sharp line between such a condition and the normal one.
[Marginal note: Hangs together with the concept of 'knowledge'.]³⁶

The transition is gradual and not marked by any sharp boundary. With the chair, which disappears intermittently, Wittgenstein already provides an example in PI 80 of such events. It is known from earlier writings that for Wittgenstein, knowledge and doubt belong *in* language games, they are not applicable to their preconditions like frameworks. "Knowledge interests us only in the game", Wittgenstein wrote in MS 119, 139 from 1936.

His examples in *Zettel* are also reminiscent of PI 416 and again of remarks in OC. It is - for example - difficult to find a place in a language-game for the expression "I have consciousness" (Z 401) or for Moore's "I know that I have two hands" from Z 405 with a source in TS 232. We do not usually use "knowledge", according to Wittgenstein in Z 406, "in this sense". Only philosophers would say this (cf. Z 405³⁷). According to Wittgenstein in TS 233 and in agreement with parts of OC (1989), these are not utterances at all; they can be treated like «whistling or humming" (Z 401).

And when Wittgenstein writes in Z 402 that the certainty associated with such expressions "is like a mighty force whose point of application does not move, and so no work is accomplished by it", one is reminded of the "hinges in which those [empirical propositions] move" (MS 175, 48r. / 1951) from OC §341. This means that we can neither *know* such so-called "facts", on which our normality depends, nor present them in sentences, state them or assert them with a claim to truth against someone.

According to Wittgenstein, we cannot even pretend that we are conscious (cf. Z 395). In TS 233, Wittgenstein not only states the meaninglessness of such statements, but also gives rhetorical advice to those who are confronted with a statement such as "I have consciousness":

Suppose someone were to say this to me - why shouldn't I get used to making no answer to him instead of starting an argument? (Z 401)³⁸

III.

Not everyone is free who mocks his chains.³⁹
(MS 133, 9a / Oct. 1946)

8. Conclusion: Language as a social affair or "Wittgenstein's writings from 1946 onwards represent in certain ways departures in *new* directions" (von Wright 1982, 136)

The TS 233 contains remarks that Wittgenstein selected (from 10 TSS) and that Wittgenstein compiled into a box he himself referred to as "Zettel". This is the material with which Wittgenstein worked intensively and to which Wittgenstein referred in conversations with von Wright. - These are the sources of the authority of the 'Zettel' material, which von Wright reinforces by assigning it the number "233" in his list about Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*.

It remains to be noted that TS 233 and its publication as *Zettel* is a 'work' with many unanswered questions. Much is unknown, much is highly controversial. Neither Wittgenstein nor Geach, Anscombe or von Wright are known to have written anything about the whereabouts of the missing box, the origins of the collection or the production of the TS; apart from a few words in their preface (cf. 1981, iii-iv). For now, we can only

³⁶In OC 1989, §616ff. Wittgenstein takes up the topic again in a similar way when he asks „But would it be *unthinkable* for me to stay in the saddle, even if the facts were extremely unfavourable? “ (Original: “Aber wäre es denn *undenkbar*, dass ich im Sattel bliebe, auch wenn die Tatsachen noch so sehr bockten?“).

³⁷ And he continues the remark with “but one may well say: ‘I am unable to doubt that I have two hands.’” (Z 405).

³⁸ Wittgenstein makes a similar comment in OC §495: „One might simply say, O, rubbish! ‘to someone who wanted to make objections to the propositions that are beyond doubt. That is, not reply to him but admonish him’”. But the fact that we do not find Wittgenstein's 'final remarks' on this subject in TS 233 is evident from PI 416 (Sentences “like [...] ‘I am conscious’ really have their uses.”) and OC §622 (“But now it is also correct to use ‘I know’ in the contexts which Moore mentioned, at least *in particular circumstances*. [...] For each one of these sentences I can imagine circumstances that turn it into a move in one of our language-games, and by that it loses everything that is philosophically astonishing”).

³⁹ Original: “Es ist nicht jeder frei, der seiner Fesseln spottet.” (MS 133. 9a / Oct. 1946)

speculate about when the Zettel-box were created by Wittgenstein, whether the collection in the box was complete, or whether Wittgenstein really wanted to use all the fragments in the box, what arrangement for these fragments he had in mind and – of course, what he intended to do with them.⁴⁰ It is undisputed that the collection of paper slips (text carriers) in Geach's TS 233A, B has potential for improvement; at least when it comes to the arrangement of the fragments.⁴¹ Furthermore, the publications (1967/81) of the slips of paper leaves its readers with several questions about their relationship to the TS 233 and with this to Wittgenstein's box. For their use it is in any case advisable to consult TS 233. By labelling the fragments, Wittgenstein himself made sure to reveal a path to the network of remarks in his Nachlass, of which the fragments of TS 233 are only a small part. This and many other important information are withheld from the reader.

Despite all the problems, the publication of *Zettel* in 1967 represented a valuable contribution to Wittgenstein scholarship, as OC (1969), ROC (1977), RPP (1980) and LW (1982) had not been published at that time. But today, near by 60 years later, one can expect this material in a better shape. However, TS 233 possesses several formal and substantive characteristics that set it apart from other typescripts by Wittgenstein. From a formal point of view, the selection of 740 remarks from 1929–1948 covers a more comprehensive period than almost any other work by Wittgenstein.⁴² The remarks in the box are also among the most extensively revised in the entire *Nachlass*. TS 233 is not only one of the first works that were published after his TS 227, it is also possibly the last ('youngest') surviving TS of the entire *Nachlass*, since TS 234 on Part II ("Philosophie der Psychologie – Ein Fragment") of the PI is lost, and there are no typescripts of either OC or ROC whose MSS are regarded as fragments.

With reference to Wittgenstein's other works (TSS and MSS) at that time TS 233 can be seen both as a mediator and as a prelude ("Präludium") to a future work by Wittgenstein. The remarks in TS 233, which refer to TS 228, ensure a connection to the content of PI I (TS 227) and its sources, which extend from the sources of TS 208 into the early 1929s. The remarks in TS 229 and TS 232 establish a link to PI II (MS 144, TS 234) as well as to the manuscripts MSS 130–38 (1946–48) and MSS 170–77 (1949–51). Many of these TS's sources can be discovered by the content of a remark. Insofar as *Zettel* deals, for example, with the system of language and thematize the internal relationship of language to reality is this often done in the context of numerous remarks known from PI I. The remarks on the preconditions of our language-games and the related concepts of knowledge and doubt are often taken from TSS 229 and 232 and can be found in TS 234 (PI II) and later works in a similar way. But it is also apparent that these ideas from TSS 229, and 232 are not entirely new compared to those in PI I and older writings. On the contrary, there is sufficient evidence that some of them are already present in early sources of PI I.⁴³

Because of its composition, von Wright (1990, 143) describes the *Zettel* (TS 233) as the middle part of a trilogy (this means between PI I and PI II (*Philosophie of Psychology – A Fragment*)⁴⁴; while Rothhaupt (1996, 326) suggests that it should be understood as a "bridge" to Wittgenstein's last MSS from the period from 1949 to 1951. Following von Wright, Rothhaupt (cf. 1996, 326) points to a thematic continuity between the *Zettel* (TS 233) and the later writings. Kienzler, on the other hand, takes the view that the slips of paper contain material for further elaboration of PI I, which he regards as a "fragment". According to Kienzler, the slips of paper "therefore form an important addition to the *investigations*" (cf. Kienzler 2016, 34).

⁴⁰ It is therefore not always clear on what criteria Wittgenstein bases his selection.

⁴¹ The criticism here is not directed at the order of the fragments selected by Geach – which is always open to debate – but rather at the way in which he has crammed them into his two account books. (Why not three, four or five? Or why should they be fixed at all?)

⁴² Comparable with the collection of fragments of TS 212 and its re-presentation in the *Big Typescript* (TS 213) from 1933.

⁴³ See Child (2011: 1919), who states, "similar themes appear in earlier work, including Wittgenstein's 1937 notebooks [...] and Philosophical Investigations §§324–6 and §§466–86".

⁴⁴ "It is not implausible to assume," says von Wright, "that Wittgenstein intended to use the *Zettel* to 'bridge the gap' between the current Part I and the current Part II" (von Wright 1990, 143.)

All this speaks in favour of (1.) the remarkable content richness of this TS and could also (2.) provide arguments for the unity of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language since 1929.⁴⁵ On this basis, the *Zettel* may contain a contribution to the discussion about a "third Wittgenstein", as claimed by Moyal-Sharrock (2004, 1) and disputed, for example, by Venturinha (2007). Finally, it should not be overlooked that *Zettel* can also contribute to a better (easier) understanding of the so-called "Part II (*Philosophie der Psychologie – Ein Fragment*)" of the PI as Dennis Paul suggested (cf. Dennis Paul, 2007, 248f.) - Against this background, it seems unlikely to me to regard the TS 233 as an only kind of table of content relating to other TSS of Wittgenstein; as vi can find it with TS 235 for TS 230.

To sum up, it can be said that Wittgenstein in TS 233 demonstrates the scope and limits of human mental life through his grammatical investigations of our psychological vocabulary and its concepts. The thesis "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (PI 43) is an essential part of TS 233 too, together with its social implications: We cannot play the language-games with psychological concepts alone. (Cp. PI 248.) It is not up to us to decide what we mean by the words we use. (cf. PI 190).⁴⁶ In TS 233, Wittgenstein prefers to describe what he called "practice" in PI 202 in the form of a detailed description of our language-games as part of our *life*. By this I call the use of our language "a social affair".⁴⁷

Here we learn – what is known from PI I - that the grammar of our psychological verbs is autonomous in that it cannot be compared with a pre-linguistic reality. On the other hand, the grammar of these concepts – which, in the course of Wittgenstein's investigations, proves to be the result of human abilities, instinctive behaviour, training (drill), interests and circumstances dependent on nature (including human nature) – is not under the control of those whose lives (cf. PI 199) are constitutive for them.⁴⁸

With remarks that - as many believe - are among the best that Wittgenstein has ever written about this topic in his entire *Nachlass*, Wittgenstein shows how deeply rooted the grammar of these verbs is in our lives; and thus, what a lost cause the philosopher is in who wants to make this explicit. It becomes clear by this that people have not created (invented) their psychological inventory (cf. MS 137, 9a); rather, they have the concepts that they have earned ("sich verdient haben") by doing so.⁴⁹ Wittgenstein emphasizes this idea in *Zettel* and in MS 137⁵⁰ with numerous remarks: Concepts characterize a society (cf. Z 371). Language expresses what is important to us (Cp. MS 108, 28/1929)⁵¹. Concepts determine the course ("Verlauf") of our lives (cf. Z 388). Our conceptual distinctions have "become *natural* to us with language, or languages" (MS 137: 65a). We master these concepts only to the extent that we allow ourselves to be mastered by them. If you want to master a language, you have to submit to it. In this way we become one with the language we have learnt, the language we grow up with. Our lives have become intertwined with our language. (Cf. MS 137, 41b.)

⁴⁵Only Wittgenstein's extensive work on the foundations of mathematics (FOM 1989) is missing here.

⁴⁶ It is tempting here to understand the use of language (every utterance) in analogy to a "social contract in miniature". Both the speaker and the listener are in a more or less silent agreement that they are bound by the meaning the expression has within their "group." (Cp. for example PI 504.)

⁴⁷ It is possible that this expresses a kind of transition from a more 'linguistic a priori' in PI I and earlier writings to a more 'cultural a priori' in TS 233, in line with PI II. This 'transition' becomes even clearer when we compare TS 233 with Wittgenstein's statements from the early 1930s, when he wrote: "[...] we must speak 'of books' and *suchlike*, and not of some linguistic pipe dream ("Wolkenkuckucksheim")" (MS 110, 296, emphasis by me).

⁴⁸ Whether this results in (moderate) conventionalism, linguistic idealism, realism or naturalism is not the subject of my paper. Rather, my aim is to point out that the remarks in TS 233 contain important arguments relevant to this topic. For example, Forster (2005, 3f.) explicitly refers to the significance of the *Zettel* as evidence for his "diversity thesis" and an arbitrary- and non-arbitrariness of grammar by Wittgenstein.

⁴⁹ Our concepts are not a matter of choice; they are *not* determined by majority vote! (Cp. Z 429). As he also points out in MS 137, humans invented human language "just as little as they invented walking on two legs" (MS 137. 9a).

⁵⁰MS 137 was written by Wittgenstein between February 1948 and January 1949. He uses it for both the TS 232 and the MS 144.

⁵¹ In MS 108, 28 (1929; emphasis by me) Wittgenstein writes: "For example, we talk about an optical illusion and associate this expression with the idea of an error, even though there isn't actually an error. If appearance were usually *more important* than measurement results in life, then the language used to describe this phenomenon would also reflect a different attitude".

This opens to the question: Are we the slaves of our language as the slaves are in Wittgenstein's imaginary language-games? (Cf. Z 108, Z 528, Z 530.) I think that TS 233 is characterized by the fact that it addresses human's ambivalent relationship with his psychological concepts in a special way: Our psychological concepts are both the result of our interests (cf. Z 378) and that what directs our interests (cf. PI 570)⁵². Or to say it the other way round: our choice of these concepts is not a matter of choice.⁵³

When Wittgenstein examines the grammar of psychological concepts, their origins and the conditions ("prerequisites") for their meaningful use in *Zettel* (TS 233), by constructing imaginary language-games, it is no longer just a matter of therapy and deconstructive rejection of conceptual confusions in the sense of PI I. His intention here is not only to work out the everyday use of our psychological verbs and concepts and, where necessary, to trace it back into an existing grammatical tradition. Building on that, in TS 233 he takes a step further. By referring to imaginary language-games, that stands in opposition to our own, by discussing the preconditions of such "customs (usages, institutions)" (PI 199), the natural and social origins of our concepts he opens up the possibility of showing and questioning "the fixed rails along which all our thinking runs, and so our judgment and action goes according to them too" (Z 375 / BPP 1984: II, §679). Insofar as this succeeds, the *Zettel* can help the reader *not* to explain these concepts but make her aware of what she is *doing*. The use of psychological concepts is a form of action, not of thinking or describing something; it is a manifestation of life; without reason. This may help to develop a (critical) understanding of our psychological concepts, of our language-games and thus – as Wittgenstein puts it in MS 137 – of our life. Because:

Other concepts - that means: other language games, thus another life (MS 137, 8b).⁵⁴

An image of human (self-image) based on a conceptual chauvinism that consists in believing that our psychological "concepts are the only correct ones, the only ones *worthy of highly developed human beings*" (MS 130, 76/1946, emphasis from me; cp. PI II, xii, §365), "whoever would have others would not realize something that we realize" (MS 130, 77)⁵⁵ seems difficult to reconcile with the *Zettel*.⁵⁶ In accordance with his philosophical inquiry in the *Zettel*, Wittgenstein presents a (further) thought experiment:

[...] imagine certain general facts of nature differently than they are & other conceptualizations than ours will seem *natural* to you. (130: 77f.)⁵⁷

It is again worth mentioning here that Wittgenstein does *not* demand that non-grammatical use of language be replaced by a grammatically correct use, as he strives for in large parts of PI I - and in large parts of the *Zettel* too. Rather, what is required is a critical approach to *our existing, everyday habits of thought*. The traditions (customs) themselves and thus the way of life of those who embody them are put to the test. Nobody's is doing anything wrong here. No metaphysical questions are involved. Nobody's grammar must be corrected here. In accordance with PI 124, actual language use is not affected here. Again: Wittgenstein's

⁵² "Concepts guide us to investigations. "Are the expression of our interest and direct our interest," Wittgenstein states in PI 570.

⁵³ In MS 133, Wittgenstein speaks of "the language games that we consider // take seriously // being very biased in our selection" ["sehr parteiisch ausgewählt"] (MS 133, 10a / Oct. 1946).

⁵⁴ And he goes on in the manuscript to point out the limitations of such thought experiments: "But another life is // is called // one that is similar to ours; otherwise, we would no longer regard it as 'life' [...]" (MS 137, 8b). - Cp. my remarks about Wittgenstein's method on page 9 of this paper.

⁵⁵ Cf. ROC §293: "We could say people's concepts show what matters to them and what doesn't. But it's not as if this *explained* the particular concepts they have. It is only to rule out the view that we have the right concepts and other people the wrong ones. (There is a continuum between an error in calculation and a different mode of calculating)".

⁵⁶ Similarly, Rajesh and Rajasekaran (2019, 1385) understand "chauvinism" as "an irrational belief in the superiority or dominance of one's own group or people". Conservationists are known to use the term to criticize humans' sense of superiority over other species, as expressed by the term "species chauvinism." See in addition e.g. Peter Singer: *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals*, 1975.

⁵⁷ With reference to PI II, xii, §366 and remarks from the notes (including Z 357, Z 376, Z 378), Majetschak points out that Wittgenstein is not concerned with explaining people's concepts, but rather with "protecting us from the philosophical temptation to regard our own conceptual systems as the only correct ones, self-evident, as it were, natural ones". (Majetschak 2020, 182.)

idea here is to go out. Find you well in other lives by imagining other concepts like ours as *natural*.⁵⁸ Understand them! Nothing less is required here than feeling home in foreign concepts and lives; and becoming estranged from one's own culture. Or how Malcolm puts it in relation to Z 380⁵⁹:

For in describing forms of life, world-pictures, language-games, real or imaginary, that differ from our own, we are enabled to reflect on our own concept and to see them objectively; we distance ourselves from our concepts and view them from outside, as it were. (Malcolm 1995, 102)

And he adds a little bit later in connection with this how he thinks about Wittgenstein's later philosophy:

One of the great endeavors of Wittgenstein's later philosophical work is to show how we can detach ourselves from our own concepts by making them objects of study, through comparison with other imagined concepts and corresponding forms of life. (Malcolm 1995, 102f.)

Wittgenstein offers the reader in TS 233 language-games of foreign people as a reflection (mirror) of what is familiar with him.⁶⁰ Not with some advice about what we should do, but only by a description of what we are doing day by day. In agreement with an old motto of Wittgenstein, we may say here: the philosopher "can only hand over the keys; everyone has to unlock the door themselves" (110, 98 / 1931)⁶¹.

The connection between language-games with psychological concepts and humans' life (and its cultural, physical, biological limitations) that Wittgenstein emphasizes in *Zettel* brings us back to von Wright's judgement about "Wittgenstein's writings from 1946 onwards" as something that "represent in certain ways departures in *new* direction" (v. Wright 1982a, 136). How did von Wright understand Wittgenstein's late Philosophy? - It can almost be seen as a commentary on the *Zettel* when von Wright, in his article "Wittgenstein in relation to his times" (v. Wright 1982), writes about Wittgenstein's view of the nature of philosophy:

Wittgenstein's view of the entrenchment of the individual in social reality is intimately connected with his view of the nature of philosophy. The problems of philosophy have their root in a distortion or malfunctioning of the language games which in its turn signalizes that something is wrong with the ways in which men live (v. Wright 1982b, 111).

And a little bit later: "Human beings are deeply embedded in philosophical— i.e. grammatical—confusions" (v. Wright 1982b, 113). Von Wright emphasizes in his article that this applies in particular to the philosophy of psychology, since – as made clear by the *Zettel*⁶² – it must fight with both behaviourism and mentalism (cp. v. Wright 1982, 112). A healing for "the sickness of philosophical problems" (v. Wright 1982b, 112) requires nothing less than a transformation of the community's way of thinking and way of life (cp. v. Wright 1982b, 112). This means, according to von Wright, that language-games will have to be changed and the language will have to be rewarded. By von Wright, Wittgenstein certainly did not regard this as something that could be achieved "through the efforts of an individual" (v. Wright 1982b, 112)⁶³ In his

⁵⁸ Wittgenstein writes about the realization of this project in manuscript MS 137 with reference to our colour system: "If we imagine a world in which (the) colours play a different role than in ours, then concepts other than those to which we are accustomed will no longer seem unnatural to us". (MS 137, 99B.)

⁵⁹ Wittgenstein describes here a tribe that feels pity and concern only where there is visible injury; and not by pain-behaviour alone. (Cp. Z 380)

⁶⁰ There are many language-games with an anthropological scenario in PI I also (cf. PI 157, PI 200, PI 206f., PI 528) but I believe, however, that Wittgenstein's fictional language-games in TS 233 (cf. "anthropoid brutes", Z 108) are particularly noteworthy in this respect.

⁶¹ "Ich kann nur die Schlüssel reichen aufsperrern muss jeder selbst" (MS 110, 98). At times, Wittgenstein goes a step further in *Zettel* as well by making his own suggestions as to how our established concepts should be altered. For example, in Z 372 he writes: "One imagines the feeble-minded under the aspect of the degenerate [...]. And so under that of disorder instead of a more primitive order (which would be a far more fruitful way of looking at them)".

⁶² Arguments against behaviourism (cf. Z 523) and mentalism (cf. Z 469) or, as Hacker (1997, 50) puts it with reference to Z 541, against a neurophysiological psychology, can be found throughout the *Zettel*.

⁶³ Cf. The philosopher, so von Wright again on behalf of Wittgenstein, can do nothing more than "to expose the disorder in the language-games, describe it, and thereby rid his mind of the torments produced by the unrecognised illness" (von Wright 1981, 113) without this having any "important consequences of a social nature, either for habits of thinking or for way of life" (v.

article "The Passion and Problem of Philosophy" (v. Wright 1957)⁶⁴, in which Jakola (2020, 67) identifies von Wright's interpretation of Wittgenstein's warning in Z 456⁶⁵, von Wright complains that it is precisely these problems that generally play no part in academic controversies. "What one is often missing in the modern analyst is the problem, an 'illness that is to be healed'" (v. Wright 1957 / Jakola 2020, 67). "That the thought misses the seriousness of 'life and death' which makes philosophy relevant for the greater cultural context" (v. Wright 1957 / Jakola 2020, 67). In other words: von Wright accuses the academic elite here, in line with Wittgenstein's Z 456, of ignoring the philosophical problems that affect people's everyday lives.⁶⁶

We have seen that Wittgenstein in *Zettel* (cp. Z 375) - in opposition to this kind of philosophy - puts forward the view "that the individual's beliefs, judgements, and thoughts are entrenched in unquestioningly accepted language-games and socially sanctioned forms of life" (v. Wright 1982b, 118). May be by thoughts like these von Wright was convinced that TS 233 is "more than just a collection of material for academic controversy" (v. Wright 1947)⁶⁷. That he has found in *Zettel* what he calls "the seriousness of 'life and death'" (v. Wright 1957 / Jakola 2020, 67) in agreement with that Wittgenstein is asking for in Z 456. Perhaps von Wright believed that TS 233 contains something that is *relevant* for – as he called it – "the greater cultural context" (v. Wright 1957 / Jakola 2020, 67). That these remarks matters to our life how we live them.. Taking this for granted, it should not be a surprise that he took these remarks about the connection between life and language in his list about Wittgenstein's work; despite all the formal problems of the text. And maybe he gives with this one example that Wittgenstein's later philosophy "departures in new direction"" (v. Wright 1982a, 136).

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If there are no further questions, perhaps we can discuss one of the following topics::

1. Should Geach's TS 233 be revised, or should the box be reconstructed? - Do we need a new edition?
2. Does TS 233 rightly belong among Wittgenstein's works? What role can it play?
3. How significant is it that TS 233 does not meet the conditions for being a 'work by Wittgenstein'? (Cp. Schulte 1989, 52.)⁶⁸
4. Is TS 233 the "work" in the *Nachlass* that most comprehensively reflects Wittgenstein's philosophy of language from 1930? („Is this not about 'everything'?!“)
5. How marked is the philosophical distinction between PI I (TS 227) and TS 233?
6. Where do language-games with psychological verbs (concepts) come from? (Interest I)
7. Are we bound by the prevailing usage of our psychological verbs (concepts)? (Interest II)
8. Can we imagine a different use of language-games?
9. Can we adopt a critical stance towards our language-games (forms of life)?
10. Can we change our language-games (ways of life)? (Cp. 6.)
11. Is philosophy by Wittgenstein a descriptive enterprise only?

Wright 1982, 113). And he adds "Wittgenstein's attitude to language [...] is a fighting but not a reformist attitude" (von Wright 1982, 113). Wittgenstein's own reasoning for this can be found (for example) already in MS 113, 23v from February 1932. Some of the key terms here are "embedded in grammatical confusions," "the human tendency to think in this way," "to tear people out of relationships in which they are trapped", "the necessary regrouping of language," and "instinctive revolt against language."

⁶⁴ All quotations from v. Wright's article "The Passion and Problem of Philosophy" (1957) sind Jakola 2020 entnommen.

⁶⁵ Z 456: "Some philosophers (or whatever you like to call them) suffer from what may be called 'loss of problems' [...]" (MS 113, 44v / 1932.) It stands to reason that Wittgenstein applied this requirement not only to others, but also to himself; as an expression of self-commitment. One must ensure that his box is filled for the most part with remarks that meet his expectations!

⁶⁶ Following Jakola (2020, 69) von Wright attempts to avoid this 'mistake' in his article "The Variety of Goodness" (1963).

Östermann describes in his paper "Healing the Rift: How G.H. von Wright Made Philosophy Relevant to His Life" (2019), the autobiographical background on which von Wright's philosophical views are based.

⁶⁷ The quotation is taken from a letter written by V. Wright to Ludwig Wittgenstein in July 1947; the manuscript was published by McGuinness (2008: 414); and is reproduced here from Jakola 2020, 68.

⁶⁸ Cp. Schulte's concept of work, which is based primarily on three requirements: 1. the text should express Wittgenstein's intention that this is an independent work. 2. The remarks in the text should be connected by a recognizable line of arguments. 3. the text must give a complete impression due to its form; "to call it a 'completed' work" (Schulte 1993, p. 3.)

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